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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1980, Missouri enacted a modified version of the Uniform Ar-
bitration Act of 1955 (UAA). 1 Prior to the enactment of the Missouri Act
(Act), Missouri courts would not enforce agreements to arbitrate, 2
1. RSMO §§ 435.350-.470 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Arbitration is a process by
which parties select an impartial third party (the arbitrator) and refer disputes to
him. The arbitrator then resolves the disputes based on the evidence and
arguments presented by the parties. The parties agree in advance that the ar-
bitrator's determination will be binding and that their dispute will be resolved
outside the ordinary judicial processes. Resort to the courts usually will be pro-
hibited any time there is a valid arbitration agreement. See text accompanying
notes 9-11 infra. The parties' voluntary agreement to forego the use of litigation is
enforceable. Enforcement of this agreement has survived constitutional
challenges due to the voluntary nature of arbitration. The parties are not de-
prived of the use of the courts-they have chosen another method of dispute
resolution. E.g., Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 276 (1932)
(federal law, non-UAA); Snyder v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. App. 2d 263, 269-71,
74 P.2d 782, 785-86 (1937) (non-UAA); Sommer v. Mackay, 10 N.J. Misc. 644,
645, 160 A. 495,496 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (non-UAA); Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg,
Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 271-73, 130 N.E. 288, 290-91 (1921) (non-UAA).
An interesting comparison can be made between laws recognizing the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements and the recently invalidated Missouri
statute which required an initial submission of medical malpractice claims to a
review board before suit could be brought. The Missouri Supreme Court declared
the medical malpractice claims statute to be in violation of MO. CONST. art. I, §
14, which guarantees access to the courts. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. En Banc 1979). The
essential difference between the two types of statutes appears to be that, in one
case, arbitration is voluntary whereas, in the unconstitutional statute, the process
was required.
2. RSMO §§ 435.010-.020 (1978). See, e.g., Tureman v. Altman, 361 Mo.
627
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although the courts would enforce an arbitration award.8 The most
significant change wrought by the new law is the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate. 4
Under the Act, arbitration is likely to become an important method
for resolving commercial disputes and labor-management disputes not
pre-empted by federal law.5 In states that have modern arbitration
1220, 1229, 239 S.W.2d 304, 309 (En Banc 1951); Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d
370, 375 (Mo. App., St. L. 1964); Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374
S.W.2d 606, 610 (Mo. App., K.C. 1963). For a discussion of the law in Missouri
regarding arbitration prior to the passage of the Act, see Comment, Commercial
Arbitration: A Need for Reform, 36 MO. L. REV. 343 (1971).
In passing the Act, the legislature did not repeal Missouri's prior arbitration
statute, RSMO § 435.010 (1978), which provided that an agreement to arbitrate
was nota bar to suit. The Act is limited in application to written agreements bet-
ween "commercial persons" or between a commercial person and another. "Com-
mercial persons" is defined as "all persons and legal entities, excluding any
government or governmental subdivision or agency." Id. § 435.465.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1980). The Act is limited further in application to agreements made subse-
quent to August 13, 1980, the effective date of the Act. Id. § 435.445.
Presumably, the previously existing statute will continue to apply to all arbitra-
tion agreements made before the effective date of the Act, to oral agreements,
and to agreements between governmental units.
3. See, e.g., Fernandes Grain Co. v. Hunter, 217 Mo. App. 187, 196, 274
S.W. 901, 904 (St. L. 1925); Beckett v. Wiglesworth, 178 S.W. 898, 899-900 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1915).
4. RSMO § 435.350 (Cum. Supp. 1980). In addition to the enforceability
of arbitration agreements provision, the Act adds the following provisions ad-
dressing areas previously not dealt with by statute: (1) a method to compel or stay
arbitration, and to stay court proceedings on issues which are arbitrable, id. §
435.355; (2) the court may appoint arbitrators if the parties' method of appoint-
ment fails, id. § 435.360; (3) a right to counsel and to cross-examine witnesses, id.
§§ 435.370(2), .375; (4) the arbitrators may permit depositions to preserve
testimony, id. § 435.380.2; (5) awards are required to be made within a time
agreed on by the parties or as set by order of the court, id. § 435.385.2; (6) the ar-
bitrator has the power to modify or correct awards, id. § 435.390. The Act
eliminates provisions contained in the previous statute which gave the arbitrator
the power to punish for contempt and required a request for confirmation to be
made within one year of award. Id. §§ 435.040, .090 (1978). Both statutes require
notice of the hearing to be given to the parties, but the Act sets five days as
minimum for notice. Compare id. § 435.370(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) with id. §
435.050 (1978). The standards for vacating or modifying and correcting an
award by the courts are, however, substantially the same. Compare id. §§
435.405-.410 (Cum. Supp. 1980) with id §§ 435.100-.110 (1978).
5. State law will be pre-empted by federal iabor law which has developed
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
E.g., Teamsters Local 116 v. Fargo-Moorhead Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 459 F. Supp.
558, 560-61 (D.N.D. 1978); Grubb v. Leroy L. Wade & Son, Inc., 384 S.W.2d
528, 534-35 (Mo. 1964). The federal law, however, may be supplemented in labor
2
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statutes, arbitration has been used in a variety of other situations. 6 This
Comment will focus on enforcement of arbitration agreements and on
arbitration by state arbitration law. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 457 (1957). See generally Comment, The Applicability of State Ar-
bitration Statutes to Proceedings Subject to LMRA Section 301, 27 OHIO ST. L.
REV. 692 (1966).
A state's version of the UAA also may control arbitration under collective
bargaining contracts involving public employees since they are not protected by
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). For example,
Maine and Minnesota provide expressly in their versions of the UAA that the
statute applies to disputes arising under arbitation provisions in collective bar-
gaining contracts. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 572.08 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). Both states have used the UAA provi-
sions to govern labor arbitration where the employer was the state or a subdivision
of the state. E.g., Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 5 v. M.S.A.D. No. 5 Teachers
Ass'n, 324 A.2d 308, 312 (Me. 1974); State v. Berthiaume, __ Minn. -I
__ 259 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1977). Illinois has not included specifically labor ar-
bitration in its version of the UAA, although it exempted labor arbitration from
the section dealing with vacating awards, thereby implying that the rest of the
statute covered labor arbitration. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 112(e) (Smith-
Hurd Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). Illinois has recognized that the statute applies to
collective bargaining agreements involving public employees. E.g., Board of
Educ. v. Johnson, 21 Ill. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974); Board of Educ. v.
Champaign Educ. Ass'n, 15 Ill. App. 3d 335, 304 N.E.2d 138 (1973). The Illinois
courts have restricted the ability of governmental units to contract to arbitrate,
however, by examining arbitration agreements for the delegation of
nondelegable powers. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Cook County Teachers
Local 1600, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1056, 318 N.E.2d 197, 199-200 (1974); Board
of Educ. v. Johnson, 21 Ill. App. 3d 482, 491-92, 315 N.E.2d 634, 642 (1974).
The Missouri Act neither excludes nor includes labor disputes from its provi-
sions. The argument can be made that, to the extent the government can execute
collective bargaining agreements, arbitration provisions in those contracts will be
governed by the Act. For a rejection of this view, see Maryland Classified
Employees Ass'n v. Anderson, 281 Md. 496, 506-13, 380 A.2d 1032, 1037-41
(1977).
Many states have enacted specific statutes dealing with arbitration in rela-
tion to public employees in general or with regard to particular classes of
employees, such as firemen. Where there is such a statute, it would control ar-
bitration with regard to the particular group. These statutes seem to be aimed
more at arbitration of disputes arising during contract negotiation than at
disputes arising during the term of a contract. See generally McAvoy, Binding
Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in
the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1972).
6. Examples of areas where arbitration clauses have been used to settle
disputes are uninsured motorists settlements under insurance policies, separation
agreements in divorce proceedings, and the administration of decedents' estates.
See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1264 (1968); Aksen, Arbitration Under the Uninsured
Motorist Endorsement, 1965 INS. L.J. 17; Coulson, Family Arbitration-An Ex-
1981] 629
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judicial review of arbitration awards. It will address in less detail the re-
maining aspects of the Act. Most of the case law cited is from jurisdictions
that have adopted the UAA, but there is a considerable body of law from
jurisdictions that have similar, although not identical, statutes.7
II. ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
The fundamental objective of the Act is to provide expeditious and in-
expensive resolution of disputes without judicial involvement., Nonethe-
less, the Act provides opportunities for judicial intervention at various
stages of the procedure. The first opportunity arises when the arbitrability
of a dispute is challenged. Under the Act, a court may compel arbitration
on a showing that there is an agreement to arbitrate and that a party to the
agreement has refused to proceed with arbitration. 9 Conversely, a court
may stay arbitration that is either pending or commenced on a showing
that there is no such agreement.10 In either case, the court must proceed
summarily and disregard the merits of the dispute to be arbitrated."
Thus, at this initial stage the role of the court is limited to enforcing the ar-
bitration clause of a contract or finding that no arbitration clause exists.
Questions regarding the remainder of the contract are reserved for the ar-
bitrator.
In determining the issue of arbitrability for purposes of compelling or
staying arbitration, the courts utilize a two-step analysis: (1) is there an ar-
bitration agreement in effect between the parties; if so, (2) does that agree-
ment contemplate resolution of the particular controversy via arbitra-
tion?' 2 Parties generally use a specific clause in a contract to establish an
arbitration agreement and, ordinarily, that clause will leave no doubt
ercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAM. L.Q. 22 (1969); Zack, Arbitration: Step-child of Wills
and Estates, 11 ARB. J. 179 (1956); Comment, The Validity ofArbitration Provi-
sions in Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (1967).
7. Uniform construction among the states adopting the UAA is one pur-
pose of the uniform statute. See RSMO § 435.450 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Therefore,
court interpretations from adopting states should be more influential in Missouri
courts than is normally the case. See Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 389
N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 564 P.2d 30, 45 (Alaska
1977); Snowberger v. Young, 24 Ariz. App. 177, 179, 536 P.2d 1069, 1070
(1975); Eric A. Carlstrom Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 77,
Minn. -, -, 256 N.W.2d 479, 483 (1977).
9. RSMO § 435.355.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
10. Id. § 435.355.2.
11. Id. § 435.355.1-.2.
12. See, e.g., People ex rel. Delisi Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 26 111.
App. 3d 893, 894-95, 326 N.E.2d 55, 57 (1975); Harrison F. Blades, Inc. v. Jar-
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about its intended effect. It is unnecessary, however, to use any specific
language or even to use a form of the word "arbitrate," if it is evident that
the parties intended to submit controversies to a third party for
resolution.1 3
It also is possible to incorporate an arbitration agreement by reference.
Incorporation can be accomplished either through reference to a par-
ticular arbitration agreement in another contract, e.g., incorporation by a
subcontract of the arbitration rules contained in the general contract, 14 or
through incorporation of the trade rules of an organization to which one or
both of the parties belong.'- Where an agreement to arbitrate is not con-
tained in the contract, but is incorporated by reference, it is more likely
that some courts will find that one or more of the parties did not intend to
make arbitration their exclusive remedy.' 6 This tendency seems logical in
light of the voluntary nature of arbitration. If a provision for enforceable
arbitration is not set forth clearly in a contract, there is reason to question
whether a party has intended to waive his right to use the courts. The
deciding factor appears to be whether the agreement was incorporated in
such a manner as to make the party aware that arbitration was to be the
sole means of dispute resolution.17 This problem should be obviated under
the Act since the statute specifically requires any contract which contains
an arbitration agreement also to contain a statement in ten-point capital
letters: "THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION
13. See, e.g., Joseph F. Trionfo & Sons, Inc. v. Ernest B. LaRosa & Sons,
Inc., 38 Md. App. 598, 605, 381 A.2d 727, 731-33 (1978) (court decided clause
did not cover the particular dispute).
14. See, e.g., Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 92 Nev. 721, 724, 558 P.2d
517, 518-19 (1976) (general contract incorporated agreement by reference to ex-
ternal document, subcontract incorporated agreement by reference to general
contract); Nordenstrom v. Swedberg, 143 N.W.2d 848, 851 (N.D. 1966) (sub-
contract incorporated agreement by reference to general contract).
15. See, e.g., FrankJ. Rooney, Inc. v. Charles W. Ackerman, Inc., 219 So.
2d 110, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (incorporation by reference of American
Institute of Architects' provisions for arbitration); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr.
Co., 92 Nev. 721, 724, 558 P.2d 517, 518-19 (1976) (incorporation by reference
of American Institute of Architects' provisions for arbitration).
Courts also may enforce arbitration if a trade association to which both par-
ties belong has rules which provide for arbitration of disputes between members.
E.g., Johnson v. Schuberth, 40 Ill. App. 2d 467, 475, 189 N.E.2d 768, 772 (1963)
(prior to passage of UAA in Illinois); Maine Cent. R.R. v. Bangor & Aroostook
R.R., 395 A.2d 1107, 1117-19 (Me. 1978).
16. See generally M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 7.01 (1968). Domke's discussion relies primarily on New York
and federal law, but cases from those courts are cited often by UAA jurisdictions
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PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES."' 8
When the requisite notice is included in the contract, a party will find it
difficult to argue that a reasonable person would have been unaware of the
arbitration provision. The statute does not specify the consequences of
omitting the notice. Presumably, the arbitration agreement would be
unenforceable.
If the court finds an arbitration agreement to be in effect between the
parties, it then must decide whether the agreement contemplates resolu-
tion of the particular controversy via arbitration. The arbitration clause
may be as specific or as broad as the parties desire, and the court must ap-
ply the clause as written. 19 Often, arbitration clauses will be written in
general language, e.g., stating that the parties will arbitrate "all disputes
arising in connection with this contract. " 20 When such language is used,
the court must construe the clause in the light of the particular controver-
sy. Various approaches have been taken. In Harrison F. Blades, Inc. v.
Jarman Memorial Hospital Building Fund, Inc.,21 the arbitration clause
included the "all disputes" language quoted in the above example. The
dispute focused on which party to a construction contract was responsible
for extra costs incurred by the contractor due to delays and changes caused
by the owner. The court looked to the remainder of the contract, which
provided that the contractor was excused from paying liquidated damages
for delays caused by the owner, but which did not address the question of
payment of extra costs caused by those delays. The court held that the
dispute was not covered by the arbitration clause because the contract did
not address the particular issue in question. 22
18. RSMO § 435.460 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
19. See Flood v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. 2d 91, 93, 242 N.E.2d 149,
151 (1968); Roosevelt Univ. v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 28 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1057,
331 N.E.2d 835, 844 (1975); Safeway Ins. Co. v. Parker, 105 Ill. App. 2d 208,
210, 245 N.E.2d 75, 76 (1969); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Loring, 91111. App.
2d 372, 376,-235 N.E.2d 418, 420-21 (1968).
In cases where there is a question regarding the authority of a public body to
make an agreement to arbitrate particular matters, the courts may refuse to ap-
ply an agreement to arbitrate. Board of Trustees v. Cook County College
Teachers Local 1600, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1056, 318 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1974);
County of Stephenson v. Bradley & Bradley, Inc., 2 Ill. App. 3d 421, 425, 275
N.E.2d 675, 678 (1971).
20. Harrison F. Blades, Inc. v. Jarman Memorial Hosp. Bldg. Fund, Inc.,
109 Ill. App. 2d 224, 228, 248 N.E.2d 289, 292 (1969).
21. 109 Ill. App. 2d 224, 248 N.E.2d 289 (1969).
22. Id. at 230, 248 N.E.2d at 292. Accord, Silver Cross Hosp. v. S.N.
Nielson Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1002, 291 N.E.2d 247, 248-49 (1972) (contract
mentioned contractor's responsibility for flood damage, but not owner's,
therefore, owner's responsibility not within clause); Henry B. Byors & Sons, Inc.
v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 358 Mass. 354, 364, 264 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (1970)
632 [Vol. 46
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In contrast, the court in Roosevelt. University v. Mayfair Construction
Co.23 found that a clause allowing arbitration of "[a]ll claims, disputes and
other matters in question arising out of, or relating to the contract or the
breach thereof' was broader than the clause used in Blades.24 The
Roosevelt court deemed it significant that the contract specifically ex-
empted only two types of controversies from arbitration. The court refused
to infer any other exceptions, holding that a dispute centered on owner-
caused delays in construction was arbitrable. 25
The contrast between Blades and Roosevelt can be explained by a dif-
ference in the two courts' philosophies of the applicability of arbitration
clauses. The Blades court adopted a narrow approach: any issue not
specifically mentioned in the contract is not arbitrable. Roosevelt ex-
emplifies the broad approach that an arbitration clause should be inter-
preted to cover any dispute which has its source in the performance of the
contract, regardless of whether the parties anticipated the issue. The deci-
sions are both from Illinois; this may explain the attempt in Roosevelt to
distinguish the clauses used. Nevertheless, Roosevelt represents the ma-
jority view that doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitrability, and that
arbitration clauses should be interpreted broadly. 26
The courts ultimately are responsible for deciding whether a dispute is
arbitrable. A few courts have taken the position that, when the scope of an
arbitration agreement is unclear, the decision about its applicability in-
itially should be made by the arbitrator, subject to review by the court.27
This stance seems to be motivated by a desire to promote expeditious
handling of disputes through arbitration, and at the same time to develop
a record on the issue of arbitrability before a decision on that issue is made
by the court. If the arbitrator decides the case is arbitrable and the
challenging party is dissatisfied with the award, that party still may raise
(clause reading "all disputes arising under this contract" did not cover demand
charge for water service since demand charge not mentioned in contract,
although charge was valid between parties).
23. 28 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 331 N.E.2d 835 (1975).
24. Id. at 1056, 331 N.E.2d at 844.
25. Id. For a detailed discussion of how the Illinois courts have handled the
issue of arbitrability, see Kalevitch, Arbitrability: The Uniform Arbitration Act
in Illinois, 4 LOY. CHI. L.J. 23 (1973).
26. See, e.g., University of Alaska v. Modem Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132,
1138 (Alaska 1974); Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc.,
21 Md. App. 307, 321-22, 320 A.2d 558, 570 (1974); American Airlines, Inc. v.
Licon Assocs., 56 A.D.2d 774, 774, 392 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (1977) (mem.) (non-
UAA).
27. School Dist. No. 46 v. Del Bianco, 68 Ill. App. 2d 145, 155, 215 N.E.2d
25, 30 (1966); Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21
Md. App. 307, 321, 320 A.2d 558, 570 (1974); Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents
of Univ. of Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 291, 123 N.W.2d 371, 376-77 (1963).
1981]
7
Bozarth: Bozarth: Uniform Arbitration Act in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the issue either in an application to vacate the award or in opposition to the
other party's motion to have the award confirmed. 28 Thus, the opportuni-
ty to have the court decide the issue of arbitrability is not lost by initially
referring the case to an arbitrator. Nevertheless, the preferred course is for
the court to decide the issue of arbitrability when it hears the application
to compel or to stay arbitration. If the court decides the issue initially, the
parties will not have to spend time and effort in arbitration, only to
discover that they must litigate the dispute because it is not covered by the
agreement to arbitate. When the arbitrator makes the initial decision on
arbitrability, such a duplication of effort could result.
An agreement to arbitrate may be severable from the contract and re-
main in effect even when the remainder of the contract is unenforceable.
Several jurisdictions have recognized the severability of arbitration
agreements.2 9 Severability becomes an issue when one party challenges the
validity of an entire contract, part of which is an agreement to arbitrate, or
when a party wishes to rescind a contract according to its termsA0 Where
the court finds an arbitration clause severable, the issue of the validity of
the contract or its recission will be usually one for the arbitrator rather
than for the courts.31 Although a jurisdiction may recognize arbitration
clauses as severable, there are other factors which make the issue of con-
tract validity or rescission nonarbitrable. If there is a dispute whether the
arbitration clause is valid, e.g., a claim that the clause was induced by
28. RSMO §§ 435.400-.405 (Cum. Supp. 1980). For a discussion of the ap-
propriate times for challenging arbitrability, see text accompanying notes 46-51
infra. See Roosevelt Univ. v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 28 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1051-52,
331 N.E.2d 835, 843 (1975) (discussion of significance of challenging arbitrabil-
ity in motion to stay as opposed to motion to vacate).
29. E.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,
409-11 (2d Cir. 1959) (federal law) (arbitration clause severable), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 801 (1961); Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 387,
-, 400 N.E.2d 858, 861-62 (1980) (arbitration clause severable); Atcas v.
Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 348, 197 N.W.2d 448, 456 (1972)
(recognized severability, but stated fraud in inducement arbitrable only where
agreement indicates intention to arbitrate issue).
30. See Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 387, -,
400 N.E.2d 858, 861-62 (1980) (fraud in inducement of contract is issue for ar-
bitration); Glenn Acres, Inc. v. Cliffwood Corp., 353 Mass. 150, 154, 228 N.E.2d
835, 838 (1967) (arbitration of dispute over duties of parties following rescission
was proper); Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 348, 197 N.W.2d
448, 456 (1972) (fraud in inducement not covered by arbitrati6n clause); Pinkis v.
Network Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 345, 512 P.2d 751, 757 (1973) (fraud
in inducement arbitrable). See generally M. DOMKE, supra note 16, §§ 8.01-.06.
31. See Nelley v. Mayor & City Council, 224 Md. 1, 166 A.2d 234 (1960);
Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 387, 400 N.E.2d 858
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fraud, the court will decide the validity or rescission of the entire contract,
even though the arbitration clause was severable.3 2 On the other hand, if a
party claims to be the victim of fraudulent inducement, but has accepted
some of the benefits of the contract and seeks damages for the fraud rather
than contesting the validity of the contract, including the arbitartion
clause, the damages issue is arbitrable33 By accepting some of the benefits
of the contract, the party will have accepted the contract method for
resolving disputes. The courts also may consider whether the arbitration
clause is broad enough to cover the issue of contract validity or rescission.34
The fact that an arbitration clause is severable, however, does not
guarantee that all disputes are arbitrable; even those jurisdictions which
recognize severability limit the application of the doctrine. The party
desiring to arbitrate still must be prepared to show that the particular ar-
bitration clause covered the type of dispute at hand, and that the clause is
not subject to a claim of invalidity.
The Act differs from the UAA in that it specifically exempts from its
provisions "contracts of insurance and contracts of adhesion."3 By ex-
cluding contracts of insurance, Missouri has eliminated an area where ar-
bitration frequently is used in other jurisdictions-uninsured motorist
claimsA. 6 Although adhesion contracts are not excluded from the UAA,
many courts have refused to enforce arbitration provisions in such con-
tracts.3 7 Presumably the phrase "adhesion contracts" in the Act has the
same meaning as in Missouri case law. The case law definition covers stan-
dardized contracts which are imposed on one party who lacks any signifi-
cant negotiation and bargaining power.3 8 For this reason, an arbitration
32. See Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 387, -,
400 N.E.2d 858, 861 (1980); Miller v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234,
238-39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (applying federal act).
33. See Nelley v. Mayor & City Council, 224 Md. 1, 14, 166 A.2d 234, 240
(1960); Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 348, 197 N.W.2d 448,
456 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. at 348, 197
N.W.2d at 456.
35. RSMO § 435.350 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
36. See generally Aksen, supra note 6.
37. See Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33 ARB. J. 41
(June 1978).
38. Surface v. Ranger Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Mo. App., Spr. 1975).
Since the Act specifies that arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are unen-
forceable per se, there would be no need to consider the question of conscionabil-
ity. It has been stated that adhesion contracts are unconscionable only where "ex-
acted by the overreaching of a contracting party who is in an unfairly superior
bargaining position." USA Chem., Inc. v. Lewis, 557 S.W.2d 15, 24 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1977). Presumably, the arbitration clause in adhesion contracts will be
unenforceable without affecting the validity of the remainder of the contract.
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clause found in a preprinted contract into which one party has had no in-
put may prove unenforceable in Missouri. Since an arbitration clause, in
theory, reflects a voluntary choice of the parties to forego the use of the
courts, any situation where the bargaining power of the parties is
significantly unequal arguably negates the volitional element of arbitra-
tion.A9 In all likelihood, the same reasoning persuaded Missouri to exclude
insurance contracts from the Act; insurance contracts have the
characteristics of adhesion contracts and the insured parties have no real
choice in foregoing use of the courts.
An untimely demand or application for an order compelling arbita-
tion will make an arbitration clause unenforceable. The parties may insert
a provision in the arbitration clause limiting the time within which a de-
mand may be made. The interpretation and enforcement of such limits
usually will be left to the arbitrator.40 In the absence of a contractual limit
on the time for making a demand, no statute of limitation applies because
arbitration is not an action at law. 41 Once a demand has been made and
refused, however, a cause of action for breach of the contract to arbitrate
does accrue, and the statute of limitations will apply with respect to an ap-
plication for compelling arbitration.42
Laches may apply when no demand has been made and there is no
contractual time limit for making a demand.43 Authority is divided,
however, as to whether the arbitrator or the court should decide if a party
is barred by laches. 4 It is equally unclear whether the parties can initiate a
court action over the subject of the dispute once it has been determined
39. See Stone, A Paradox in the Theory of Commercial Arbitration, 21
ARB. J. 156 (1966). For a discussion of the importance of volition in arbitration,
see note 1 supra.
40. See, e.g., Lewiston Fire Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 167
(Me. 1976); Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md.
App. 307, 330, 320 A.2d 558, 572 (1974); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 92
Nev. 721, 731, 558 P.2d 517, 521-23 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Lewiston Fire Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 167
(Me. 1976); Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 300 Minn. 149, 155,
218 N.W.2d 751, 755 (1974).
42. Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 300 Minn. at 155, 218
N.W.2d at 755-56.
43. See, e.g., Buckley v. Small, 52 Mich. App. 454, 456, 217 N.W.2d 422,
423 (1974); Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 300 Minn. at 157, 218
N.W.2d at 756.
44. Compare U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc. v. Pan Am. Gyro-Tex
Co., 345 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (federal law); Buckley v. Small, 52 Mich.
App. 454, 217 N.W.2d 422 (1974) with Halcon Int'l v. Monsanto Austl. Ltd., 446
F.2d 156, 163 (7th Cir. 1971) (federal law, non-UAA); Lewiston Fire Ass'n v. City
of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 167 (Me. 1976). See Commercial Arbitration-The
Defense of Laches, 16 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 680 (1972) (discussing federal law).
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that the time has expired for initiating arbitration.45 As a practical matter,
in many cases when time limits for demanding arbitration have expired,
the time limit also will have passed on the legal cause of action.
The time limits for initiating arbitration reflect a tendency to allow the
parties maximum control over the resolution of their disputes. Parties may
designate contractually the time limits which will control. Nevertheless,
the courts will establish an equitable limit for the initiation of arbitration
through the use of laches.
A claim that a dispute is not arbitrable also may be lost by failure to
assert the claim in a timely manner. It has been held, for example, that the
lack of an agreement to arbitrate cannot be raised for the first time after
an award has been issued.46 In contrast, when a party contests arbitrability
at the initial hearing to compel arbitration, at the arbitration hearing, and
at the confirmation proceedings, the issue of arbitrabiity is raised in a
timely fashion and is preserved for appeal following confirmation. 47 A
claim of nonarbitrability is not untimely simply because the party pro-
ceeded to arbitration on demand. A party may withdraw from the pro-
ceeding and request a stay of arbitration, provided he does so prior to the
making of an award."8
Once a party has asserted the claim of nonarbitrability in a timely
fashion by raising the issue in opposition to a motion to compel arbitra-
tion, he does not waive the claim by failing to appeal the order compelling
arbitration. In fact, many jurisdictions do not allow one to appeal an order
compelling arbitration.4 9 The Act lists the types of orders which are ap-
45. Martin Domke states that it is well settled that a party would be pre-
cluded from initiating a court action if that party has lost his right to arbitrate
due to delay. M. DOMKE, supra note 16, § 15.02, at 148. See also Chambers v.
Beaunit Corp., 404 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1968) (federal law, non-UAA); River
Brand Rice Mills v. Latrobe Brewery Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 41, 110 N.E.2d 545, 547,
122 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (1953) (non-UAA). There does not seem to be sufficient
authority, however, to say that the question is well settled. Nevertheless, the argu-
ment in favor of the view is sound. To allow suit would be contrary to the contrac-
tual agreement to arbitrate controversies. As a practical matter, the issue will
arise only when the time delay has not exceeded the statute of limitations for the
particular cause of action.
46. Borg, Inc. v. Morris Middle School Dist. No. 54, 3 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916,
278 N.E.2d 818, 820-21 (1972); Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Mll. App. 2d 262, 273,
243 N.E.2d 711, 717 (1968).
47. See Detroit Demolition Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 45 Mich. App. 72,
78, 205 N.W.2d 856, 860-61 (1973).
48. See Borg, Inc. v. Morris Middle School Dist. No. 54, 3 Ill. App. 3d 913,
916, 278 N.E.2d 818, 820-21 (1972).
49. Roeder v. Huish, 105 Ariz. 508, 510,467 P.2d 902, 904 (1970); Maietta
v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 293, 297 A.2d 244, 247-48 (1972); School Comm'r v.
Agawan Educ. Ass'n, 371 Mass. 845, 359 N.E.2d 956 (1977). But see Property
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pealable; an order compellng arbitration is not among them.50 Thus, in
Missouri, it seems that a party may raise and preserve nonarbitrability as a
ground to vacate simply by asserting that claim at proceedings to compel
arbitration and reasserting it before the arbitrator. If there is no pro-
ceeding to compel arbitration, a party may accomplish the same result by
making a motion to stay and then contesting arbitrability before the ar-
bitrator, if the motion is denied.51
Although an award will not be made solely on the basis of one party's
default,5 2 it is possible to arbitrate a dispute ex parte. The impact of the
rules on ex parte arbitration is to prevent a party from frustrating the ar-
bitration process by refusing to participate, but at the same time to
preserve that party's right to have a court determine the arbitrability of the
dispute.53 The Act specifically provides that a controversy may be resolved
on the evidence, notwithstanding the failure of one party to appear after
adequate notice. There is some case law, however, that courts will en-
force ex parte awards only if there is a prior court order compelling ar-
bitration or if the arbitration agreement specifically provided for ex parte
arbitration.5 5 Incorporating the arbitration rules of an agency, such as the
Management, Ltd. v. Howasa, Inc., 14 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539, 302 N.E.2d 754,
756 (1973) (order compelling arbitration and staying court proceedings was ap-
pealable); Miyoi v. Gold Bond Stamp Co. Employees Retirement Trust, 293
Minn. 376, 378, 196 N.W.2d 309, 310 (1972) (allowed discretionary appeal deny-
ing stay of arbitration if danger of irreparable damage).
50. RSMO § 455.440 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
51. Id. § 435.405.1(5) provides that an award may be vacated because there
was no agreement to arbitrate if the issue was not determined adversely in a pro-
ceeding to compel or stay and the party did not participate in the hearing without
raising that objection.
52. The Act provides that the arbitrator may make an award "notwith-
standing the failure of a party duly notified to appear," but that the award will be
made "upon the evidence produced." Id. § 455.370(1). The clear implication is
that no award can be made without evidence being produced.
53. Id. § 435.405.1(5).
54. Id. § 435.370(1).
55. See, e.g., Maine Cent. R.R. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 395 A.2d
1107, 1117-19 (Me. 1978). In Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Ill. App. 2d 262, 243
N.E.2d 711 (1968), the court held that
where an agreement to arbitrate is incident to the main agreement of the
parties, and one of the said parties, without fault on the part of the
other, fails and refuses to proceed with the portion of the agreement pro-
viding for arbitration, then such other party may proceed to establish his
claim before the arbitrator regardless of the nonappearance of the other
party.
Id. at 271-72, 243 N.E.2d at 716. This language indicates that neither an order
compelling arbitration nor a reference to rules providing for ex parte arbitration
is necessary before valid ex parte arbitration can occur. In Ramonas, however,
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American Arbitration Association, which provide for ex parte arbitration,
has been found to be a sufficient provision for ex parte arbitration. 56
Another problem with ex parte arbitration, when there is no court order to
arbitrate, is that a party who refuses to participate in arbitration still may
contest arbitrability of the dispute through a motion to vacate the award.5 7
The procedure would not be available had there been a prior order com-
pelling arbitration. Given the expeditious procedures for compelling ar-
bitration by court order under the Act, it would be preferable for the party
desiring to arbitrate to procure a court order, and thus avoid any litigation
over the propriety of an ex parte award.
III. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
Two methods commonly used for choosing arbitrators are either to
name the arbitrator(s) in advance or to select the arbitrator(s) through an
agency such as the American Arbitration Association." If the chosen
method fails to provide arbitrators as contemplated by the agreement, the
Act provides that the court may appoint arbitrators.5" Unfortunately, the
Act does not delineate the guidelines to be used by the court. Likewise, the
case law provides little guidance. Nevertheless, the court must follow the
arbitration agreement as closely as possible and may not exercise its power
until the agreement has failed. 60 There are situations where the parties will
contemplate appointing arbitrators who are not strictly neutral, e.g., in
tripartite arbitration, each party selects an arbitrator, and the two arbitra-
tors select a third, neutral arbitrator. There is non-UAA authority sug-
gesting that where a vacancy is in one of the nonneutral positions, the
the parties had incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration Association,
which provided for ex parte proceedings. Id. at 265, 243 N.E.2d at 713. See
generally M. DOMKE, supra note 16, § 18.04.
56. See Maine Cent. R.R. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 395 A.2d 1107 (Me.
1978); Battle v. General Cellulose Co., 23 N.J. 538, 129 A.2d 865 (1957) (non-
UAA).
Section 29 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association provides:
Unless the law provides to the contrary, the arbitration may proceed
in the absence of any party, who, after due notice, fails to be present or
fails to obtain an adjournment. An award shall not be made solely on the
default of a party. The Arbitrator shall require the party who is present
to submit such evidence as he may require for the making of an award.
57. See RSMO § 435.405.1(5) (Curn. Supp. 1980).
58. The Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association set out the method for choosing arbitrators in § 12.
59. RSMO § 435.360 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Prior Missouri law did not have a
comparable provision.
60. See Roberto Constr. Co. v. Burnham-Manning Post No. 1105, 347
Mass. 400, 404, 198 N.E.2d 302, 304 (1964).
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court should appoint an arbitrator who will act in the same capacity.61 In
any other case, the guiding principles for court appointment of arbitrators
presumably will be impartiality and qualifications to hear the particular
dispute.
The Act contemplates that the arbitrator will conduct a hearing at
which the parties may present their cases. 62 It does not provide a method of
discovery in preparing for the hearing, and courts generally have declined
to make the civil rules of discovery available to participants in arbitra-
tion. 63 The rationale expressed by one court was that "arbitration, once
undertaken, should continue freely without being subjected to a judicial
restraint which would tend to render the proceedings neither one thing nor
the other, but transform them into a hybrid, part judicial and part ar-
bitrational." 64 This aspect of arbitration serves to expedite the proceedings
and to maintain an informal atmosphere, even though it requires par-
ticipation in a hearing without the degree of preparation common to
litigation. The parties could agree to allow discovery if they believe it is
necessary to the presentation of a case, but apparently this is done infre-
quently. 65 Even where the parties agree to allow discovery, the court will
not supervise the proceeding since it is not a part of litigation before the
court. Thus, the parties also would have to provide for resolving any
disputes over discovery, with an attendant reduction of the expediency
and economy which make arbitration attractive.
The Act does grant subpoena power to the arbitrator, 6 and does pro-
vide for the taking of depositions to preserve testimony of witnesses who
cannot be compelled to attend a hearing or who will be unable to attend.6 7
These provisions insure that the parties can present evidence material to
the controversy, as guaranteed by the Act. 68 The arbitrator may exercise
61. See, e.g., Karpinecz v. Marshall, 48 Misc. 2d 8, 9-10, 264 N.Y.S.2d 65,
68 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Cf. Grant v. Koppelman, 59 Misc. 2d 271, 273, 298 N.Y.S.2d
329, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (allowing party extension of time to appoint member to
tripartite panel).
62. RSMO § 435.370 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
63. E.g., Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 457, 258 N.E.2d
561, 564 (1970); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 117,
597 P.2d 290, 302 (1979) (federal law); Lutz Eng'r Co. v. Sterling Eng'r & Constr.
Co., 112 R.I. 605, 611, 314A.2d 8, 10-11 (1974) (non-UAA). But cf. Bigge Crane
& Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (federal
law, non-UAA) (court pointed to exceptional circumstances in ordering
discovery). See G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION § 3.03 (1977).
64. Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 457, 258 N.E.2d 561,
564 (1970).
65. See GOLDBERG, supra note 63, § 3.03.
66. RSMo § 435.380.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
67. Id. § 435.380.2.
68. Id. § 435.370(2).
[Vol. 46
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/4
UNIFORM ARBITRATION A CT
his discretion in the use of these tools, but if his decisions show partiality,
the award will be vacated. 69 Therefore, the Act provides the parties with
the means to present their case and assures fairness in the application of
those means.
The Act provides only minimal procedural requirements for hear-
ings. 70 The parties are free to establish the procedure to be followed and
the rules of evidence to be used, if any. Such provisions in an agreement
are not subject to alteration by the courts or the arbitrator. 71 It is not a
ground for attacking an award that a procedural or evidentiary decision is
contrary to what a court would have decided. 2 Where no rules of pro-
cedure or evidence are provided in the agreement, the arbitrator has con-
siderable power to administer the hearing, with limited review of his
decisions, 73 e.g., the arbitrator may apply formal rules of evidence if the
agreement does not otherwise provide, 74 as long as he does not exclude
material evidence.75 The better practice may be for the arbitrator to im-
pose as few procedural and evidentiary rules as possible for the conduct of
an orderly and fair hearing. This restraint will help preserve the informal
and expeditious nature of arbitration.
The Act provides certain procedural safeguards for the conduct of
hearings. The parties have a right to notice five days before the hearing.7 6
There is the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing, which may
not be waived by any agreement prior to the hearing." Finally, the parties
are guaranteed the right to be heard, to present material evidence, and to
69. Id. § 435.405.1(2).
70. The procedural requirements pertaining to the hearing are notice of the
hearing to the parties, postponement on request for good cause, hearing material
evidence, allowing cross-examination, having all arbitrators present, and allow-
ing attorneys to represent the parties. Id. §§ 435.370-.375.
71. See Stop & Shop Cos. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 364 Mass. 325, 330, 304
N.E.2d 429, 432 (1973).
72. See Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Button & Goode, Inc., 242
Md. 509, 517, 219 A.2d 801, 807 (1966); McGovern v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co.,
359 Mass. 443, 445, 269 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1971).
73. RSMO § 435.405 (Gum. Supp. 1980) (grounds for review). See notes
101-127 and accompanying text infra.
74. Gozdor v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 52 Mich. App. 49, 51, 216
N.W.2d 436, 438 (1974).
75. RSMO § 435.370(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980). See generally Annot., 75
A.L.R.3d 132 (1977). The arbitrator may not be free to restrict the admission of
evidence in all jurisdictions. For example, Indiana's version of the UAA provides
that "[t]he parties are entitled to be heard, to present any and all evidence
material to the controversy regardless of its admissibility under judicial rules of
evidence." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-6(b) (Burns 1973).
76. RSMo § 435.370(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
77. Id. § 435.375.
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cross-examine witnesses. 78 These minimal safeguards guarantee pro-
cedural fairness without making the arbitration process unduly long or
complicated. The Act insures the effectiveness of the safeguards by pro-
viding that the omission of any of them is a ground for vacating an
award. 79 Prior to the adoption of the modified UAA, Missouri law pro-
vided essentially the same safeguards of notice and presentation of
evidence, 80 but there were no comparable requirements concerning cross-
examination or the right to representation by counsel.
When the hearing concludes,8 1 the arbitrator must submit an award to
the parties. The award must be made within the time fixed by the agree-
ment or, when no time was agreed on, within the time fixed by the court
after application of one of the parties.8 2 Failure to make an award in a
timely fashion makes the award ineffective,8 3 but a party may waive any
time limit by failing to object to the delay prior to the time the award is
delivered to that party. 4 The provisions on timeliness of an award, in
keeping with the other provisions and interpretions of the Act, allow the
parties to control the process and provide for court intervention only when
necessary to assure that the arbitration process will be effectuated.
The only requirements concerning the form of the award are that it be
in writing and that it be signed by each arbitrator joining in the award. 8
The award may include monetary relief or, if the parties so provide in the
agreement, there is authority that an order for specific performance may
be made.86 There is no requirement that the award contain a statement of
78. Id. § 435.370(2).
79. Id. § 435.405.
80. Id. § 435.050 (1978).
81. It is not mandatory that an oral hearing be held. For example, under
the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, §
36, a waiver of such hearing may be made.
82. RSMO § 435.385.2 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
83. See Goble v. Central Security Mut. Ins. Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 298, 301,
260 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1970) (defect waived); Sweet Assocs. v. Central School
Dist., 21 A.D.2d 726, 727, 250 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99 (1964) (non-UAA) (award made
within limit).
84. RSMo § 435.385.2 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Goble v. Central Security
Mut. Ins. Co., 125 II1. App. 2d 298, 303, 260 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1970).
85. RSMo § 435.385.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
86. E.g., Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168
N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960) (specific performance of construction con-
tract); Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) (specific performance of employment contract).
A provision for specific performance could be made expressly or through
adopting, by reference, an arbitration rule such as § 42 of the Commercial Ar-
bitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. If an arbitration agree-
ment provides for specific performance, the arbitrator may award such relief,
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either findings of fact or conclusions of law. Failure to include such a state-
ment is not a basis for review by a court.8 7 Typically, the award will be
made without an opinion. The award need not address individually each
point of the submission provided it resolves the entire controversy submit-
ted.88 When the award indicates, however, that the arbitrator did not con-
sider each issue submitted, the award is not adequate. For example, when
the award specifically addresses one issue, but is silent on another, the
award may be vacated.8 9
The central requirement of an award is that it completely resolves the
parties' dispute. The detailing of logical and legal principles common to
judicial opinions is not necessary to commercial arbitration because, in ar-
bitration, there is less concern with establishing and maintaining consist-
ent legal principles than with resolving particular disputes as they arise.
IV. ENFORCEMENT AND REVIEW OF AWARDS
The Act provides that the parties may apply to the court for confirma-
tion of the arbitrator's award.90 The advantage of confirmation is that a
confirmed award may be enforced as any other judgment. 91 The court
even though a court would not. Grayson-Robinson and Staklinski both illustrate
this principle. Some of the difficulty of supervision is eliminated since it will be
the arbitrator, rather than the court, who must deal with disputes over perfor-
mance. The court's role is confined to confirming or vacating awards, which does
not require an assessment of the merits of a dispute. There is not a substantial
body of case law dealing with awards of specific performance, which may indicate
that they are not made frequently.
87. See Cohen v. Meyers, 115 Ill. App. 2d 286, 293-94, 253 N.E.2d 144,
147-48 (1969); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Cooke, 357 Mass. 763, 256 N.E.2d 447
(1970); Fazio v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 347 Mass. 254, 258, 197
N.E.2d 598, 601 (1964).
88. See Cohen v. Meyers, 115 Ill. App. 2d at 293-94, 253 N.E.2d at 147-48.
89. McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. Partnership, 32 Md. App. 205,
211, 359 A.2d 100, 103 (1976). A recent Missouri case decided under the prior ar-
bitration law held that an award which specifically addressed one of three issues
submitted and made no reference to the other two was invalid. The court charac-
terized the award as "not a final decision as to all issues submitted." Stix & Co. v.
Schoor, 579 S.W.2d 160, 162-63 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979). The statutory grounds
for review under the prior law are substantially the same as under the Act. Com-
pare RSMO § 435.100 (1978) with id. § 435.405 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Thus, the
Stix case presumably will remain good law.
90. RSMO § 435.400 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The application maybe made as a
motion. Id. § 435.425. The procedure for initiating litigation need not be fol-
lowed, except that service on the opposing party is the same as service of a sum-
mons, unless the parties agree otherwise. Id. An award also will be confirmed
where a motion to vacate is denied or where an application is granted and a
modification is made by the court. Id. §§ 435.405.4, .410.2.
91. Id. § 435.415.
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may refuse to confirm an award only if grounds sufficient to vacate or to
modify and correct the award are submitted by one of the parties 2 in op-
position to the award. A court may not refuse to confirm an award because
the relief is something the court could not grant in a suit at law,93 because
the arbitrator may have made a mistake,94 or because the court would
have acted differently.95 The effect of confirmation is to convert a contrac-
tual arrangement of the parties into a judicially recognized resolution of
the dispute. The party who procures an award has the right to use the
court's power to collect or otherwise enforce the award. The parties need
not rely on the good faith of their opponent to comply with the award, but
since the Act sets no time limit within which confirmation must be re-
quested, the prevailing party may attempt to collect an award without
court intervention. Such an effort often may be desirable in order to
preserve or improve already strained business relationships.
The courts are given limited powers to vacate96 or to modify and cor-
rect awards.9 7 There are five statutory grounds for vacating awards, and
the party seeking vacatur must allege specifically one of the statutory
grounds.98 Those grounds are: (1) the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means; (2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator
who was appointed as a neutral, or corruption of any arbitrator, or ar-
bitrator misconduct prejudicing the rights of a party; (3) the arbitrator ex-
ceeded his power; (4) the arbitrator refused to postpone a hearing when
good cause was shown for delay, refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing in a manner contrary to
the Act; and (5) there was no arbitration agreement, that issue had not
been determined adversely at a hearing to compel or stay arbitation, and
the party did not participate in arbitration without contesting arbitrabil-
ity.9 9 These are essentially the same grounds for review used under the
92. Id. § 435.400.
93. E.g., Snowberger v. Young, 24 Ariz. App. 177, 179, 536 P.2d 1069,
1071 (1975); Township of Gaines v. Carlson, Hohloch, Mitchell & Piotrowski,
Inc., 79 Mich. App. 523, 530, 261 N.W.2d 71, 74 (1977).
94. E.g., Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 363 N.E.2d
460, 464 (1977); Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay
Tramp. Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 392, 294 N.E.2d 340, 343-44 (1973).
95. E.g., Verdex Steel & Constr. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 19 Ariz. App.
547, 552, 509 P.2d 240, 245 (1973); Hatfield v. Safeco Ins. Co., 31 Mich. App.
671, 673, 188 N.W.2d 45, 46 (1971). See generally Friedman, Correcting Ar-
bitrator Error: The Limited Scope ofJudicial Review, 33 ARB. J. 9 (Dec. 1978).
96. RSMO § 435.405 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
97. Id. § 435.410.
98. E.g., Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 363 N.E.2d
460, 464 (1977); William B. Lucke, Inc. v. Spiegel, 131 Ill. App. 2d 532, 536, 266
N.E.2d 504, 508 (1970).
99. RSMO § 435.405.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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prior Missouri law.100 Under none of the grounds is a mistake of law or a
mistake of fact sufficient reason, by itself, to vacate an award.10 1 Thus, an
arbitrator may make an award based on fairness or other equitable con-
siderations, even though to do so is contrary to legal precedent.10 2 His fac-
tual findings generally are not subject to review for sufficiency or
accuracy. 0 3 This flexibility in making an award may account, in part, for
the practice of not writing an opinion. There is no need for an opinion to
justify or explain the decision to a reviewing court.
If there is a claim of corruption, fraud, or misconduct in the procure-
ment of an award, a court may review the basis of the award for evidence
supporting the claim.10 4 Even gross errors by the aribitrator are not,
however, sufficient evidence of fraud or corruption to warrant vacating an
award. 10 5 Nor is it sufficient that an award may be for an amount in excess
of what a court would have awarded. 0 6 It also has been stated that, to war-
rant vacating an award for fraud, the fraud must appear on the face of the
award. 07 This author was unable to find any cases where a court vacated
100. Compare id § 435.405 with id. § 435.100 (1978). The older statute sets
out the same grounds as in the Act, except the ground concerning arbitrability.
Arbitrability was not an issue under the older law since arbitration agreements
were not specifically enforceable.
101. See University of Alaska v. Modem Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140
(Alaska 1974); Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 363 N.E.2d
460, 464 (1977); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Button & Goode, Inc.,
242 Md. 509, 517, 219 A.2d 801, 806 (1966); Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp.
v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 390, 294 N.E.2d 340, 343-44
(1973). See generally Friedman, supra note 95.
102. See University of Alaska v. Modern Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140
(Alaska 1974); Township of Gaines v. Carlson, Hohloch, Mitchell & Piotrowski,
Inc., 79 Mich. App. 523, 530, 261 N.W.2d 71, 74 (1977).
103. See Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 363 N.E.2d
460, 464 (1977); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Button & Goode, Inc.,
242 Md. 509, 517, 219 A.2d 801, 807 (1966).
104. See, e.g., Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 363 N.E.2d
at 463-64; Del Bianco & Assocs. v. Adam, 6 Ill. App. 3d 286, 293, 285 N.E.2d
480, 484 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer
Fire Dep't v. Button & Goode, Inc., 242 Md. at 517, 219 A.2d at 806.
105. See, e.g., Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Riley Pleas, Inc., 586 P.2d 1244,
1247 (Alaska 1978); Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 363
N.E.2d at 464.
106. See, e.g., Del Bianco & Assocs. v. Adam, 6 Ill. App. 3d 286, 295, 285
N.E.2d 480, 485-86 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Country Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Kuzmickas, 2 Ill. App. 3d 313, 318, 276 N.E.2d 357, 360 (1971); Hennen
v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 312 Minn. 131, 138, 250 N.W.2d 840, 844-45
(1977).
107. See Pillott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 363 N.E.2d




Bozarth: Bozarth: Uniform Arbitration Act in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
an award under the UAA for fraud, corruption, or other undue means.
This indicates that such a claim will be difficult to support and that a party
seeking review will have a greater opportunity for success if he can
characterize his claim under one of the other grounds for vacating an
award.
Partiality of an arbitrator becomes an issue when the arbitrator is
understood to be a neutral.10 An arbitrator's relationship with a party can
be evidence of partiality. 0 9 Whether that relationship will give rise to a
presumption of partiality depends on the significance, duration, and
regularity of the relationship." 0 The arbitrator is not expected, however,
to be absolutely free of relationships with participants in the arbitration.
In fact, it apparently is not unusual for the arbitrator to know one or both
of the parties or to have business contacts with them. The dividing line is
where the relationship is significant enough to suggest that it would in-
terfere with the arbitrator's fairness. An arbitrator's conduct of a hearing
also may be evidence of partiality if that conduct reveals the requisite
bias. " In any event, the party charging partiality must allege specific acts
of the arbitrator which are evidence of the bias." 2 Where the party has
knowledge of facts indicating partiality, but does not challenge the ar-
bitrator's impartiality until after the award is issued, there is some author-
108. RSMO § 435.405.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Finkelstein v. Smith, 326
So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Missouri also recognized this general rule
in its pre-Act decisions. See, e.g., Pope Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n,
230 Mo. App. 502, 511, 92 S.W.2d 974, 979-80 (K.C. 1936). For a discussion of
when an arbitrator is a nonneutral, see note 61 and accompanying text supra.
109. E.g., Freeport Constr. Co. v. Star Forge, Inc., 61 Ill. App. 3d 999,
1003-05, 378 N.E.2d 558, 560-62 (1978); William B. Lucke, Inc. v. Spiegel, 131
Ill. App. 2d 532, 536, 266 N.E.2d 504, 508 (1970); McKinney Drilling Co. v.
Mach I Ltd. Partnership, 32 Md. App. 205, 211-12, 359 A.2d 100, 104 (1976).
See Kutner, Homo Arbiter: Emerging Judicial Man-Suggestions for Qualifica.
tions and Credentials, 37 TENN. L. REv. 365, 374-75 (1970).
110. See Freeport Constr. Co. v. Star Forge, Inc., 61 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1005,
378 N.E.2d 558, 563 (1978); St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Lusis, 6 Wash. App. 205, 212,
492 P.2d 575, 580 (1971).
If the parties have adopted the rules of the American Arbitration Association,
there is also a duty on the part of the arbitrator to disclose any relationship he may
have with a party or a witness. Failure to disclose such a relationship may result in
the award being vacated. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 697, 709-10 (1974); M.
DOMKE, supra note 16, § 21.03.
111. See, e.g., Jean A. McCoy& Sons, Inc. v. LaSalle County, 48 111. App.3d
802, 803, 363 N.E.2d 442, 443 (1977); Del Bianco & Assocs. v. Adam, 6 Ill. App.
3d 286, 293-94, 285 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955
(1973); McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. Partnership, 32 Md. App. 205,
211-12, 359 A.2d 100, 104 (1976).
112. See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kuzmickas, 2 Ill. App. 3d 313, 318, 276
N.E.2d 357, 360 (1971).
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ity that the challenge will be waived.'1 8 This rule counters the natural
tendency to see partiality in an arbitrator only after an adverse award. The
proper procedure would be for the party to ask the arbitrator to disqualify
himself as soon as there is evidence of partiality.
The most common ground for a successful challenge to an award is
that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority either by determining a mat-
ter not submitted to him or by not following the rules established by the
statute or the agreement. A controversy which is submitted to arbitration
with reference to specific guidelines, either within the agreement or incor-
porated by reference, must be decided in accordance with those guide-
lines. The arbitrator may not disregard the parties' directives or make an
award not contemplated by the agreement. Such action is in excess of the
arbitrator's authority and is a ground for vacating the award. 1 1 4 Such ac-
tion must be distinguished from the making of an award which does not
follow the law of the jurisdiction-an action which is not in excess of
authority.'1 5 When the parties agree to arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution, they do not agree necessarily that their disputes will be resolved
in the same manner as a court would resolve them. Rather, the arbitrator
is given the power to make awards suitable to the particular dispute and in
keeping with the parties' contract, even if that means, for example, using a
measure of damages a court would not use" 6 or awarding attorney fees
when a court would not. 1 1 7 The parties may agree, however, that the arbi-
trator will decide the case as a court would decide it, and failure to follow
113. See, e.g., Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Riley Pleas, Inc., 586 P.2d 1244,
1248 (Alaska 1978); Jean A. McCoy & Sons, Inc. v. LaSalle County, 48 Ill. App.
3d 802, 804, 363 N.E.2d 442, 443 (1977); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Rytex Corp., 34
N.Y.2d 123, 129, 312 N.E.2d 466, 469, 356 N.Y.S.2d 278, 282 (1974) (non-
UAA).
114. See, e.g., Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 Ill. App. 2d 133,
138-39, 248 N.E.2d 299, 303-04 (1969) (agreement required party to be "legally
entitled to recover damages"); Metropolitan Waste Control Comm'n v. Min-
netonka, 308 Minn. 385, 389-90, 242 N.W.2d 830, 832-33 (1976) (rules of Com-
mission to govern parties' actions). See also Snowberger v. Young, 24 Ariz. App.
177, 179, 536 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1975); Board of Directors of Me. School Admin.
Dist. No. 33 v. Teachers Ass'n of Me. School Admin. Dist. No. 33, 395 A.2d 461,
463 (Me. 1978).
115. See University of Alaska v. Modern Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140
(Alaska 1974); Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Ill. App. 2d 262, 274, 243 N.E.2d 711,
717 (1968); Township of Gaines v. Carlson, Hohloch, Mitchell & Piotrowski,
Inc., 79 Mich. App. 523, 529-30, 261 N.W.2d 71, 74 (1977).
116. E.g., University of Alaska v. Modern Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140
(Alaska 1974).
117. E.g., Township of Gaines v. Carlson, Hohloch, Mitchell & Piotrowski,
Inc., 79 Mich. App. 523, 530, 261 N.W.2d 71, 74 (1977).
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the law in such a case is in excess of authority."18 In essence, the parties'
agreement forms the law to be applied by the arbitrator.
Not only does the parties' agreement limit the arbitrator's actions, but
the issues submitted to the arbitrator limit the actions he may take. It is in
excess of authority to render an award which addresses an issue not sub-
mitted," 9 which fails to resolve each issue submitted,' 20 or for an arbi-
trator to allow a third party to participate in a hearing when that third
party was not a party to the arbitration agreement.' 21 The arbitrator's
authority varies from contract to contract. That authority is derived from
the agreement, rather than from statutes and case law. Allowing an arbi-
trator to exceed that authority runs counter to the voluntary basis of arbi-
tration. A charge that an arbitrator has exceeded his authority is, in
118. See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Bank, 109 Ill. App. 2d 133, 138,
248 N.E.2d 299, 303-04 (1969) (agreement required party to be "legally entitled
to recover damages"); Board of Directors of Me. School Admin. Dist. No. 33 v.
Teachers Ass'n of Me. School Admin. Dist. No. 33, 395 A.2d 461, 463 (Me. 1978)
(arbitrator to decide in accord with existing administrative and judicial
decisions).
119. See Deeb, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 208 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (non-UAA); Safeway Ins. Co. v. Parker, 105 Ill. App. 2d
208, 245 N.E.2d 75 (1969).
120. See McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. Partnership, 32 Md. App.
205, 211, 359 A.2d 100, 103 (1976) (arbitrator failed to consider a counterclaim);
Stix & Co. v. Schoor, 579 S.W.2d 160, 162-63 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (submitted
on three issues, award addressed only one; case decided under prior law).
121. See McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. Partnership, 32 Md. App.
205, 211, 359 A.2d 100, 104 (1976).
The question as to what effect an arbitration agreement may have on third par-
ties who are connected contractually with the principal parties or are otherwise
interested in arbitrable disputes is presented in a variety of contexts. Courts have
ordered joint arbitration of claims which arise out of connected contracts, such as
general contracts and subcontracts in the construction industry. Compare
Grover-Dimond Assocs. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 297 Minn. 324, 328, 211
N.W.2d 787, 790 (1973); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 92 Nev. 721, 731-33,
558 P.2d 517, 523-24 (1976) with Stop & Shop Cos. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 364
Mass. 325, 330, 304 N.E.2d 429, 432 (1973). The rights and responsibilities of
guarantors vis-a-vis arbitration are often at issue. See P.R. Post Corp. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 68 Mich. App. 182, 187, 242 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1976),
modified, 403 Mich. 543, 271 N.W.2d 521 (1978); National Recreational Prods.,
Inc. v. Gans, 46 A.D.2d 618, 619, 359 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (1974) (non-UAA). See
generally Hartigan, Effect on Surety of Arbitration Award Adverse to Principal
and Surety's Right to Participate, and the Consequences Thereof, in the Arbitra-
tion Process, 4 FORUM 249 (1969). The effect of arbitration agreements on
assignees also may be an issue. See M. DOMKE, supra note 16, § 10.05. For a
discussion of arbitration agreements in bankruptcy, see Kreindler, The Con-
vergence of Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 26 ARB. J. 34 (1971).
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essence, a charge that he has acted in a manner beyond what the parties
agreed to allow.
Unless limited by the parties' agreement, arbitrators are given consid-
erable leeway in the procedures used in conducting hearings, and review of
their conduct must take this into consideration. 1 22 Their discretion con-
cerning admission of evidence is equally great; only where material
evidence is excluded is there a ground for reversal. 123 When the arbitrator
improperly has excluded material evidence, the objection must be made at
the hearing in a manner which will preserve a record of the objection, or
the objection will be waived. 124 The rationale behind this rule appears to
be the same as that behind the policy of requiring objections to partiality
to be made before the award is rendered-the finality of awards is
safeguarded.
The court's powers to modify and correct an award are even more
limited than the power to vacate. The modification and correction pro-
cedure is designed only to correct clerical and mathematical errors. The
statutory grounds for modification and correction are: (1) there was a
miscalculation of figures or a mistake in describing any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award; (2) the award covered an area not sub-
mitted to the arbitrator and may be corrected without affecting the merits
of the decision rendered on the issues actually submitted; and (3) there was
a mistake in the form of the award not affecting the merits. 125 Only when
the error or miscalculation does not affect the merits of the award will the
court be empowered to modify or correct the award. 126 As with vacatur, a
decision of law or of fact by the arbitrator goes to the merits, thus, an error
in such a decision is not a ground for modification or correction. 127
122. See Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Button & Goode, Inc., 242
Md. 509, 518, 219 A.2d 801, 807 (1966); Friedman, supra note 95, at 13.
123. RSMo § 435.405.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Reisman v. Ranoel Real-
ty Co., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 220, 224, 303 A.2d 511, 514-15 (1973); Gallagher v.
Schernecker, 60 Wis. 2d 143, 208 N.W.2d 437 (1973). The arbitrator may apply
rules of evidence when the agreement does not speak to the contrary. See notes
73-75 and accompanying text supra.
124. See Safety Control, Inc. v. Verwin, Inc., 16 Ariz. App. 540, 542-43, 494
P.2d 740, 742-43 (1972). Many arbitration hearings are conducted without a
transcript. The American Arbitration Association rules provide for a transcript
only when a party requests one. Without a record, preservation of an objection
would have to be documented specifically.
125. RSMo § 435.410.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
126. See Ramonas v. Kerelis, 102 Ill. App. 2d 262, 274, 243 N.E.2d 711,717
(1968); Bay Ridge Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 22 A.D.2d 807, 807, 254
N.Y.S.2d 616, 618 (1964) (non-UAA).
127. See Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 390, 294 N.E.2d 340, 343-44 (1973).
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The Act places time limits on applications to vacate or to modify and
correct awards. An application to vacate must be made within ninety days
of the delivery of the award to the challenging party, or, if the grounds are
fraud, corruption, or undue means, within ninety days from the time those
grounds are known or should have been known.1 28 There is a statutory
time limit of ninety days from the delivery of the award to a party within
which that party may apply for modification or correction. The applica-
tion may be made in the alternative with a motion to vacate.129 Even
though a challenge to an award procedurally may be made in opposition to
a motion to confirm rather than as a separate motion, if confirmation is re-
quested after the time limits have passed for challenge to the award, the
challenge will be untimely.' 30 The time limits assure the finality of the
award; courts are not likely to allow circumvention of this policy. For ex-
ample, the time period for a court challenge is not extended by first apply-
ing to the arbitrator for correction or modification under the Act. '3 Nor
will a party be allowed to circumvent one of the time limits by filing an ac-
tion for declaration that the award is null and void after the time limit has
expired.1 2
In an action to vacate or modify an award, testimony of the arbitrator
is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing the grounds for vacatur or
modification. 33 There are, however, exceptions to that rule. When the
testimony of a dissenting arbitrator could establish partiality, misconduct,
or what issues were submitted, some courts will admit the testimony.1'4
Most courts would not allow an arbitrator to explain an award or to im-
128. RSMO § 435.405.2 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
129. Id. § 435.410.3.
130. See Component Sys., Inc. v. Murray Enterprises, Inc., 300 Minn. 21,
25, 217 N.W.2d 514, 516 (1974). But see Paul Allison, Inc. v. Minikin Storage,
Inc., 452 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Neb. 1978) (federal law, non-UAA).
131. See Trustees of the Boston & Me. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 395, 294 N.E.2d 340, 346 (1973).
132. See Nick-George Ltd. Partnership v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 279 Md. 385,
389, 368 A.2d 1001, 1003 (1977).
133. See Baltimore v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 236 Md. 534, 545, 204 A.2d
546, 552 (1964); Grudem Bros. v. Great Western Piping Corp., 297 Minn. 313,
318-19, 213 N.W.2d 920, 924 (1973). But see McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I
Ltd. Partnership, 32 Md. App. 205, 208, 359 A.2d 100, 102 (1976) (allowed in-
quiry of arbitrator concerning conduct of hearing and relationship to parties);
Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 291 N.C. 208, 218, 230
S.E.2d 380, 387 (1976) (testimony of arbitrator used to prove fraud or misconduct
of arbitrators).
134. See Grudem Bros. v. Great Western Piping Corp., 297 Minn. 313, 319,
213 N.W.2d 920, 924 (1973); Continential Bank Supply Co. v. Bookbinders
Local 243, 239 Mo. App. 1247, 1258, 201 S.W.2d 531, 537-38 (K.C. 1947);
Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 291 N.C. 208, 214, 230
S.E.2d 380, 385 (1976).
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peach an award in which he joined. 135 These restrictions evince a policy to
avoid requiring the arbitrator to justify his decision or to explain the pro-
cess he used in arriving at the decision. Requiring such explanations would
amount to review of awards on the merits and would tend to undercut the
arbitrator's flexibility, a crucial aspect of arbitration.
A properly issued arbitation award is a final determination of the
issues submitted to arbitration, and the parties may not litigate or re-
arbitrate those issues. 136 Adoption of any other policy toward the finality of
arbitration decisions would negate the purposes of arbitration-economic
and expeditious resolution of disputes. The res judicata effect of awards
makes arbitration meaningful because the parties can be certain that the
decision represents the end of the conflict. The confirmation of awards
puts the power of court enforcement behind the decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The Act provides an expeditious, informal, and relatively inexpensive
method for resolving disputes. In addition, it allows the parties to structure
the means for resolving their disputes and to choose arbitrators who can
best resolve them. The arbitrator, unlike a judge and jury, usually will be
acquainted with the technical information necessary to decide a case. The
savings in time and expense, along with the additional control by the par-
ties over the resolution of their disputes, often should outweigh any disad-
vantage there may be in limited review of awards. Arbitration is likely to
become a widely used option in Missouri, as it has in other jurisdicitons
with modem arbitration statutes.
KEITH S. BOZARTH
135. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 155 (1977); Note, Arbitration and
Award-Admission of Arbitrator's Depositions and Testimony to Prove Miscon-
duct or Fraud, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 803 (1977).
136. See Coleman v. Columbia Credit Co., 42 Md. App. 198, 201, 399 A.2d
943, 945 (1979); P.R. Post Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 68 Mich. App. 182, 186,
242 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1976), modiied, 403 Mich. 543, 271 N.W.2d 521 (1978).
See generally Neuberger, ResJudicata: Promise and Limitation in Non-Labor
Arbitration, 27 ARB. J. 113 (1972).
Missouri also recognized the res judicata effect of awards under the prior ar-
bitration statute. See, e.g., Masonic Temple Ass'n v. Farrar, 422 S.W.2d 95 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1967).
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